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current plans. Overly cautious attitudes to risk result from a failure to appreciate the effects of statistical aggregation in mitigating relative risk. Overly optimistic forecasts result from the adoption of an inside view of the problem, which anchors predictions on plans and scenarios.
The conflicting biases are documented in psychological research. Possible implications for decision making in organizations are examined.
(Decision Making; Risk; Forecasting; Managerial Cognition)
The thesis of this essay is that decision makers are excessively prone to treat problems as unique, neglecting both the statistics of the past and the multiple opportunities of the future. In part as a result, they are susceptible to two biases, which we label isolation errors: their forecasts of future outcomes are often anchored on plans and scenarios of success rather than on past results, and are therefore overly optimistic; their evaluations of single risky prospects neglect the possibilities of pooling risks and are therefore overly timid. We argue that the balance of the two isolation errors affects the risk-taking propensities of individuals and organizations.
The cognitive analysis of risk taking that we sketch differs from the standard rational model of economics and also from managers' view of their own activities.
The rational model describes business decisions as choices among gambles with financial outcomes, and assumes that managers' judgments of the odds are Bayesian, and that their choices maximize expected utility. In this model, uncontrollable risks are acknowledged and accepted because they are compensated by chances of gain. As March and Shapira ( 1987) reported in a well-known essay, managers reject this interpretation of their role, preferring to view risk as a challenge to be overcome by the exercise of skill and choice as a commitment to a goal. Although managers do not deny the possibility of failure, their idealized self-image is not a gambler but a prudent and determined agent, who is in control of both people and events.
The cognitive analysis accepts choice between gambles as a model of decision making, but does not adopt rationality as a maintained hypothesis. The gambling metaphor is apt because the consequences of most decisions are uncertain, and because each option could in principle be described as a probability distribution over outcomes. However, rather than suppose that decision makers are Bayesian forecasters and optimal gamblers, we shall describe them as subject to the conflicting biases of unjustified optimism and unreasonable risk aversion.
It is the optimistic denial of uncontrollable uncertainty that accounts for managers' views of themselves as (Kahneman and Tversky 1979a) , and in which commitments often escalate and sunk costs dominate decisions (Staw and Ross 1989) . We restrict the treatment to choices among options that can be considered attractive, although risky. For this class of projects we predict that there will be a general tendency to underestimate actual risks, and a general reluctance to accept significant risks once they are acknowledged.
Timid Choices
We begin by reviewing three hypotheses about individual preferences for risky prospects.
Risk Aversion. The first hypothesis is a commonplace: most people are generally risk averse, normally preferring a sure thing to a gamble of equal expected value, and a gamble of low variance over a riskier prospect. There are two important exceptions to risk aversion. First, many people are willing to pay more for lottery tickets than their expected value. Second, studies of individual choice have shown that managers, like other people, are risk-seeking in the domain of losses (Bateman and Zeithaml 1989 , Fishburn and Kochenberger 1979 , Laughhunn et al. 1980 .1 Except for these cases, and for the behavior of addictive gamblers, risk aversion is prevalent in choices between favorable prospects with known probabilities. This result has been confirmed in numerous studies, including some in which the subjects were executives (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986, Swalm 1966) .2
The standard interpretation of risk aversion is decreasing marginal utility of gains. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979a; Kahneman 1986, 1992) introduced two other causes: the certainty effect and loss aversion. The certainty effect is a sharp discrepancy between the weights that are attached to sure gains and to highly probable gains in the evaluation of prospects. In a recent study of preferences for gambles the decision weight for a probability of 0.95 was approximately 0.80 (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) .
Loss aversion refers to the observation that losses and disadvantages are weighted more than gains and advantages. Loss aversion affects decision making in numerous ways, in riskless as well as in risky contexts. It favors inaction over action and the status quo over any alternatives, because the disadvantages of these alternatives are evaluated as losses and are therefore weighted more than their advantages (Kahneman et al. 1991 , Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988 , Tversky and Kahneman 1991 . Loss aversion strongly favors the avoidance of risks. The coefficient of loss aversion was estimated as about 2 in the Tversky-Kahneman experiment, and coefficients in the range of 2 to 2.5 have been observed in several studies, with both risky and riskless prospects (for reviews, see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1991) .
Near-Proportionality. A second important generalization about risk attitudes is that, to a good first approximation, people are proportionately risk averse: cash equivalents for gambles of increasing size are (not quite)
proportional to the stakes. Readers may find it instructive to work out their cash equivalent for a 0.50 chance to win $100, then $1,000, and up to $100,000. Most readers will find that their cash equivalent increases by a factor of less than 1,000 over that range, but most will also find that the factor is more than 700. Exact 1 Observed correlations between accounting variability and mean return have also been interpreted as evidence of risk-seeking by unsuccessful firms (Bowman 1982 , Fiegenbaum 1990 , Fiegenbaum and Thomas 1988 , but this interpretation is controversial (Ruefli 1990 ).
2 A possible exception is a study by Wehrung (1989) proportionality for wholly positive prospects would imply that value is a power function, u (x) = xa, where x is the amount of gain (Keeney and Raiffa 1976) . In a recent study of preferences for gambles (Tversky and Kahneman 1992 ), a power function provided a good approximation to the data over almost two orders of magnitude, and the deviations were systematic: cash equivalents increased slightly more slowly than prizes.
Much earlier, Swalm (1966) had compared executives whose planning horizons, defined as twice the maximum amount they might recommend be spent in one year, ranged from $50,000 to $24,000,000. He measured their utility functions by testing the acceptability of mixed gambles, and observed that the functions of managers at different levels were quite similar when expressed relative to their planning horizons. The point on which we focus in this article is that there is almost as much risk aversion when stakes are small as when they are large. This is unreasonable on two grounds:
(i) small gambles do not raise issues of survival or ruin, which provide a rationale for aversion to large risks;
(ii) small gambles are usually more common, offering more opportunities for the risk-reducing effects of statistical aggregation.
Narrow Decision Frames. The third generalization is that people tend to consider decision problems one at a time, often isolating the current problem from other choices that may be pending, as well as from future opportunities to make similar decisions. The following example (from Tversky and Kahneman 1986) illustrates an extreme form of narrow framing:
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. Kreps (1988) and Spence and Zeckhauser (1972 to win $1,000 and a sure gain of $300 (also between 0.50 chance to win $10,000 and $3,000 for sure) and she is also indifferent between the status quo and a gamble that offers equal chances to win $250 or to lose (Stevens 1975) .
To appreciate the effects of even modest aggregation with this utility function, assume that the individual owns three independent gambles: one gamble with a 0.50 chance to win $500, two gambles, each with a 0.50 chance to win $250.
Simple arithmetic yields the compound gamble:
0.125 chance to win $1,000, and 0.25 to win $750, $500, and $250.
If this individual applies the correct probabilities to her utility function, this portfolio will be worth $433 to her.
This should be her minimum selling price if she owns the gamble, her cash equivalent if she has to choose between the portfolio of gambles and cash. In contrast, the sum of the cash equivalents of the gambles considered one at a time is only $300. The certainty premium the individual would pay has dropped from 40% to 13% of expected value. By the individual's own utility function, the cost of considering these gambles in isolation is 27% of their expected value, surely more than any rational decision maker should be willing to pay for whatever mental economy this isolation achieves.
The power of aggregation to overcome loss aversion is equally impressive. As already noted, our decision maker is indifferent between accepting or rejecting a gamble that offers a 0.50 chance to win $250 and a 0.50 chance to lose $100. However, she would value the opportunity to play two of these gambles at $45, and six gambles at $304. Note that the average incremental value of adding the third to the sixth gamble is $65, quite close to the EV of $75, although each gamble is worth nothing on its own.
Finally, we note that decisions about single gambles will no longer appear risk-proportional when gambles are evaluated in the context of a portfolio, even if the utility function has that property. Suppose the individual now owns a set of eleven gambles:
one gamble with a 0.50 chance to win $1,000, ten gambles, each with a 0.50 chances to win $100.
The expected value of the set is $1,000. If the gambles were considered one at a time, the sum of their cash equivalents would be only $600. With proper aggregation, however, the selling price for the package should be $934. Now suppose the decision maker considers trading only one of the gambles. After selling a gamble for an amount X, she retains a reduced compound gamble in which the constant X is added to each outcome.
The decision maker, of course, will only sell if the value of the new gamble is at least equal to the value of the original portfolio. The computed selling price for the larger gamble is $440, and the selling price for one of the smaller gambles is $49. Note that the premium given up to avoid the risk is 12% of expected value for the large gamble, but only 2% for the small one. A rational decision maker who applies a proportionately risk averse utility function to aggregate outcomes will set cash equivalents closer to risk neutrality for small gambles than for large ones.
As these elementary examples illustrate, the common attitude of strong (and proportional) aversion to risk and to losses entails a risk policy that quickly approaches neutrality as the portfolio is extended.5 Because possibilities of aggregation over future decisions always exist for an ongoing concern, and because the chances for aggregation are likely to be inversely correlated with the size of the problem, the near-proportionality of risk attitudes for gambles of varying sizes is logically incoherent, and the extreme risk aversion observed for prospects that are small relative to assets is unreasonable. To rationalize observed preferences one must assume that the decision maker approaches each choice problem as if it were her last-there seems to be no relevant tomorrow. It is somewhat surprising that the debate on the rationality of risky decisions has focused almost exclusively on the curiosities of the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, instead of on simpler observations, 5 The conclusions of the present section do not critically depend on the assumption of expected utility theory, that the decision maker weights outcomes by their probabilities. All the calculations reported above were repeated using cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) with plausible parameters (a = 0.73; b = c = 0.6 and a loss aversion coefficient of 2.5). Because extreme outcomes are assigned greater weight in prospect theory than in the expected utility model, the mitigation of risk aversion as the portfolio expands is somewhat slower. Additionally, the risk seeking that prospect theory predicts for single low-probability positive gambles is replaced by risk aversion for repeated gambles.
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE/VOl. (Tetlock and Boettger 1991) and they are extremely reluctant to accept responsibility for even a small increase in the probability of a disaster (Viscusi et al. 1987 ). Swalm (1966) noted that managers appear to have an excessive aversion to any outcome that could yield a net loss, citing the example of a manager in a firm described as "an industrial giant", who would decline to pursue a project that has a 50-50 chance of either making for his company a gain of $300,000 or losing $60,000. Swalm hypothesized that the steep slopes of utility functions in the domain of losses may be due to control procedures that bias managers against choices that might lead to losses. This interpretation seems appropriate since "several respondents stated quite clearly that they were aware that their choices were not in the best interests of the company, but that they felt them to be in their own best interests as aspiring executives."
We conclude that the forces that produce risk aversion in experimental studies of individual choice may be even stronger in the managerial context. Note, however, that we do not claim that an objective observer would describe managerial decisions as generally risk averse. The second part of this essay will argue that decisions are often based on optimistic assessments of the chances of success, and are therefore objectively riskier than the decision makers perceive them to be. Our hypotheses about risk in managerial decisions are: (i) in a generally favorable context, the threshold for accepting risk will be high, and acceptable options will be subjectively perceived as carrying low risk, (ii) for problems viewed in isolation the willingness to take risks is likely to be approximately constant for decisions that vary greatly in size, and (iii) decisions will be narrowly framed even when they could be viewed as instances of a category of similar decisions. As a consequence, we predict (iv)
an imbalance in the risks that the organization accepts in large and in small problems, such that relative risk aversion is lower for the aggregate of small decisions than for the aggregate of large decisions. These hypotheses are restricted to essentially favorable situations, A consistent risk policy can only be maintained if the recurrent problems to which the policy applies are recognized as such. This is sometimes easy: competent organizations will identify obvious recurring questionsfor example, whether or not to purchase insurance for a company vehicle-and will adopt policies for such questions. The task is more complex when each decision problem has many unique features, as might be the case for acquisitions or new product development. The explicit adoption of a broad frame will then require the use of an abstract language that highlights the important common dimensions of diverse decision problems. Formal decision analysis provides such a language, in which outcomes are expressed in money and uncertainty is quantified as probability. Other abstract languages could be used for the same purpose. As practitioners of decision analysis well know, however, the use of an abstract language conflicts with a natural tendency to describe each problem in its own terms. Abstraction necessarily involves a loss of subtlety and specificity, and the summary descriptions that permit projects to be compared almost always appear superficial and inadequate.
From the point of the individual executive who faces a succession of decisions, the maintenance of a broad decision frame also depends on how her performance will be evaluated, and on the frequency of performance 1966) , an unbalanced set of choices will be made: The aggregate of the subordinates' decisions will be more risk averse than the supervisor's own decisions on larger problems-which in turn are more risk averse than her global utility for the portfolio, rationally evaluated. As we saw in an earlier section, the costs of such inconsistencies in risk attitudes can be quite high.
Clearly, one of the goals of the executive should be to avoid the potential inefficiency, by applying a consistent policy to risky choices and to those she supervises-and the consistent policy is not one of proportional risk aversion. As was seen earlier, a rational executive who considers a portfolio consisting of one large gamble (which she chose herself) and ten smaller gambles (presumably chosen by subordinates) should be considerably more risk averse in valuing the large gamble than in valuing any one of the smaller gambles. The counter-intuitive implication of this analysis is that, in a generally favorable context, an executive should encourage subordinates to adopt a higher level of riskacceptance than the level with which she feels comfortable. This is necessary to overcome the costly effects of the (probable) insensitivity of her intuitive preferences to recurrence and aggregation. We suspect that many executives will resist this recommendation, which contradicts the common belief that accepting risks is both the duty and the prerogative of higher management.
For several reasons, narrow framing and near-proportionality could be difficult to avoid in a hierarchical organization. First, many decisions are both unique and large at the level at which they are initially made. The usual aversion to risk is likely to prevail in such decisions, even if from the point of view of the firm they could be categorized as recurrent and moderately small.
Second, it appears unfair for a supervisor to urge acceptance of a risk that a subordinate is inclined to reject-especially because the consequences of failure are likely to be more severe for the subordinate.
In summary, we have drawn on three psychological principles to derive the prediction that the risk attitudes that govern decisions of different sizes may not be coherent. The analysis suggests that there may be too much aversion to risk in problems of small or moderate size. However, the conclusion that greater risk taking should be encouraged could be premature at this point, because of the suspicion that agents' view of prospects may be systematically biased in an optimistic direction.
The combination of a risk-neutral attitude and an optimistic bias could be worse than the combination of unreasonable risk aversion and unjustified optimism.
As the next sections show, there is good reason to believe that such a dilemma indeed exists.
Bold Forecasts
Our review of research on individual risk attitudes suggests that the substantial degree of risk to which individuals and organizations willingly expose themselves is unlikely to reflect true acceptance of these risks. The alternative is that people and organizations often expose themselves to risk because they misjudge the odds. We next consider some of the mechanisms that produce the 'bold forecasts' that enable cautious decision makers to take large risks.
Inside and Outside Views
We introduce this discussion by a true story, which illustrates an important cognitive quirk that tends to produce extreme optimism in planning.
In 1976 This story illustrates several of the themes that will be developed in this section. It should be obvious that when both methods are applied with equal intelligence and skill, the outside view is much more likely to yield a realistic estimate.
In general, the future of a long and complex undertaking is simply not foreseeable in detail. The ensemble of possible future histories cannot be defined. Even if this could be done, the ensemble would in most cases be huge, and the probability of any particular scenario negligible.7 Although some scenarios are more likely or plausible than others, it is a serious error to assume that the outcomes of the most likely scenarios are also the most likely, and that outcomes for which no plausible scenarios come to mind are impossible. In particular, the scenario of flawless execution of the current plan may be much more probable a priori than any scenario for a specific sequence of events that would cause the project to take four times longer than planned. Nevertheless, the less favorable outcome could be more likely overall, because there are so many different ways for things to go wrong. The main advantage of the outside approach to forecasting is that it avoids the snares of scenario thinking (Dawes 1988 The experimental evidence indicates that base-rate information that is explicitly mentioned in the problem has some effect on predictions, though usually not as much as it should have (Griffin and Tversky 1992, Lynch and Ofir 1989: for an alternative view see Gigerenzer et al. 1988) . When only personal information is explicitly offered, relevant statistical information that is known to the respondent is largely ignored (Kahneman and Tversky 1973, Tversky and Kahneman 1983) .
The sequel to the story illustrates a third general observation: facing the facts can be intolerably demoralizing. The participants in the meeting had professional expertise in the logic of forecasting, and none even ventured to question the relevance of the forecast implied by our expert's statistics: an even chance of failure, and a completion time of seven to ten years in case of success. Neither of these outcomes was an acceptable basis for continuing the project, but no one was willing to draw the embarrassing conclusion that it should be scrapped. So, the forecast was quietly dropped from active debate, along with any pretense of long-term planning, and the project went on along its predictably unforeseeable path to eventual completion some eight years later.
The contrast between the inside and outside views has been confirmed in systematic research. One relevant set of studies was concerned with the phenomenon of overconfidence. There is massive evidence for the conclusion that people are generally overconfident in their assignments of probability to their beliefs. Overconfidence is measured by recording the proportion of cases in which statements to which an individual assigned a probability p were actually true. In many studies this proportion has been found to be far lower than p (see Lichtenstein et al. 1982 ; for a more recent discussion and some instructive exceptions see Griffin and Tversky 1992) . Overconfidence is often assessed by presenting general information questions in a multiple-choice format, where the participant chooses the most likely answer and assigns a probability to it. A typical result is that respondents are only correct on about 80% of cases when they describe themselves as "99% sure. answer. These global estimates are accurate, or somewhat pessimistic (Gigerenzer et al. 1991, Griffin and . It is evident that people's assessments of their overall accuracy does not control their confidence in particular beliefs. Academics are familiar with a related example: finishing our papers almost always takes us longer than we expected. We all know this and often say so. Why then do we continue to make the same error? Here again, the outside view does not inform judgments of particular cases.
In a compelling example of the contrast between inside and outside views, Cooper et al. (1988) interviewed new entrepreneurs about their chances of success, and also elicited from them estimates of the base rate of success for enterprises of the same kind. Self-assessed chances of success were uncorrelated to objective predictors of success such as college education, prior supervisory experience and initial capital. They were also wildly off the mark on average. Over 80% of entrepreneurs perceived their chances of success as 70% or better. Fully one-third of them described their success as certain. On the other hand, the mean chance of success that these entrepreneurs attributed to a business like theirs was 59%. Even this estimate is optimistic, though it is closer to the truth: the five-year survival rate for new firms is around 33% (Dun and Bradstreet 1967) .
The inside view does not invariably yield optimistic forecasts. Many parents of rebellious teenagers cannot imagine how their offspring would ever become a reasonable adult, and are consequently more worried than they should be, since they also know that almost all teenagers do eventually grow up. The general point is that the inside view is susceptible to the fallacies of scenario thinking and to anchoring of estimates on present values or on extrapolations of current trends.
The inside view burdens the worried parents with statistically unjustified premonitions of doom. To decision makers with a goal and a plan, the same way of thinking offers absurdly optimistic forecasts.
The cognitive mechanism we have discussed is not the only source of optimistic errors. Unrealistic optimism also has deep motivational roots (Tiger 1979) . A recent literature review (Taylor and Brown 1988) There is no reason to believe that entrepreneurs and executives are immune to optimistic bias. The prevalence of delusions of control among managers has been recognized by many authors (among others, Duhaime and Schwenk 1985, March and Shapira 1987, Salancik and  Meindl 1984). As we noted earlier, managers commonly view risk as a challenge to be overcome, and believe that risk can be modified by "managerial wisdom and skill" (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983) . The common refusal of managers to refuse risk estimates provided to them as "given" (Shapira 1986 ) is a clear illustration (Capen, Clapp and Campbell 1971; Bazerman and Samuelson 1983; Kagel and Levin 1986 ) applies here as well: the winning project is more likely than others to be associated with optimistic errors (Harrison and March 1984) . This is an effect of regression to the mean. Thus, the student who did best in an initial test is also the one for whom the most regression is expected on a subsequent test. Similarly, the projects that are forecast to have the highest returns are the ones most likely to fall short of expectations.
Officially adopted forecasts are also likely to be biased by their secondary functions as demands, commands and commitments (Lowe and Shaw 1968 , Lawler and Rhode 1976 , Lawler 1986 , Larkey and Smith 1984 . A forecast readily becomes a target, which induces loss aversion for performance that does not match expectations, and can also induce satisficing indolence when the target is exceeded. The obvious advantages of setting high goals is an incentive for higher management to adopt and disseminate optimistic assessments of future accomplishments-and possibly to deceive themselves in the process.
In his analysis of "groupthink," Janis (1982) Davis 1985) . More than 80% of the projects studied fell short of planned market share.
In an interesting discussion of the causes of failure in capital investment projects, Arnold (1986) states:
Most companies support large capital expenditure programs with a worst case analysis that examines the projects' loss potential. But the worst case forecast is almost always too optimistic.. .. When managers look at the downside they generally describe a mildly pessimistic future rather than the worst possible future.
As an antidote against rosy predictions Arnold recommends staying power analysis, a method used by lenders to determine if organizations under severe strain can make payments. In effect, the advice is for managers to adopt an outside view of their own problem.
Mergers and acquisitions provide another illustration of optimism and of illusions of control. On average, bidding firms do not make a significantly positive return.
This striking observation raises the question of why so many takeovers and mergers are initiated. Roll (1986) offers a "hubris hypothesis" to explain why decision makers acquiring firms tend to pay too much for their targets. Roll cites optimistic estimates of "economies due to synergy and (any) assessments of weak management" as the primary causes of managerial hubris. The bidding firms are prone to overestimate the control they will have over the merged organization, and to underestimate the "weak" managers who are currently in charge.
Costs and Benefits. (Roll 1986 ). In a bargaining situation, it will support a hard line that raises the risk of conflict. Neale and Bazerman (1983) Given the high cost of mistakes, it might appear obvious that a rational organization should want to base its decisions on unbiased odds, rather than on predictions painted in shades of rose. However, realism has its costs. In their review of the consequences of optimism and pessimism, Taylor and Brown (1988) reached the deeply disturbing conclusion that optimistic self-delusion is both a diagnostic indication of mental health and well-being, and a positive causal factor that contributes to successful coping with the challenges of life. The benefits of unrealistic optimism in increasing persistence in the face of difficulty have been documented by other investigators (Seligman 1991 
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis has suggested that many failures originate in the highly optimistic judgments of risks and opportunities that we label bold forecasts. In the words of March and Shapira (1987) , "managers accept risks, in part, because they do not expect that they will have to bear them." March and Shapira emphasized the role of illusions of control in this bias. We have focused on another mechanism-the adoption of an inside view of problems, which leads to anchoring on plans and on the most available scenarios. We suggest that errors of intuitive prediction can sometimes be reduced by adopting an outside view, which forecasts the outcome without attempting to forecast its history (Kahneman and Tversky 1979b) . This analysis identifies the strong intuitive preference for the inside view as a source of difficulties that are both grave and avoidable.
On the issue of risk we presented evidence that decision makers tend to deal with choices one at a time, and that their attitudes to risk exhibit risk-aversion and near-proportionality. The reluctance to take explicit responsibility for possible losses is powerful, and can be very costly in the aggregate (for a discussion of its social costs see Wildavsky 1988 
